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On Tradition, Communication and Social Reproduction 
 
Introduction 
 
In ‘Overcoming Resistance to Cultural Studies,’ Carey writes, 
how is it, through all sorts of change and diversity, through all sorts of conflicts and 
contradiction, that the miracle of social life is pulled off, that societies manage to produce and 
reproduce themselves? .... it is through communication, through the intergraded relations of 
symbols and social structure, that societies, or at least those with which we are most familiar, 
are created, maintained, and transformed. (Carey 2009, p.83-84) 
That social life, social order and a society’s self-reproduction takes place borders 
on the incredible given the differing – and often conflicting – interests between 
the various members of a society. The question of the relationship between social 
order and conflict is one that has drawn the attention and fascination of social 
theorists since Durkheim. It is an important question in that it is through the 
successful resolution of conflict that a society is ‘maintained and transformed’, 
i.e., what I am including under the term as social reproduction. 
In this paper I want to forge a closer conceptual link between the concepts of 
tradition(s)1 and communication in relation to the issue of social reproduction. I 
will argue that (a) tradition(s) necessarily constitute(s) the background of a 
society (i.e., its way of life), and that (b) for a society to reproduce itself 
communication is necessary. In effect, I am arguing for a recuperation and 
recognition of the concept of tradition(s) on the grounds that it provides the 
conditions of possibility for the communication that maintains and transforms a 
society. 
 
1.0 Tradition and society 
1.1 Tradition and social maintenance 
An analysis of the way a society reproduces itself would take as a point of 
departure the question of what it is that is being reproduced. I would like to start 
by specifying that the reproduction of a society is the reproduction of its way of 
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life, what a number of theorists call the lifeworld. Schutz, for example, defines 
the lifeworld as the everyday world in which ‘people both create social reality 
and are constrained by the pre-existing social and cultural structures created by 
their predecessors’ (Schutz cited in Ritzer 1996, p. 215). It is interesting to note 
that with the phrase ‘by their predecessors’ he is implying that these ‘pre-existing 
social and cultural structures’ do not exist in a vacuum but are the product of a 
tradition(s). It is on the role of tradition(s) as the basis of a lifeworld that I will 
focus on in this section, for the stability of the lifeworld is legitimised by virtue 
of the acceptance of the tradition(s) that inform it with attempts to implement 
changes in the lifeworld usually indicative of the decline of certain traditions.  
The Oxford English Dictionary defines tradition as ‘that which is thus handed 
down; a statement, belief or practice transmitted (especially orally) from 
generation to generation’. This definition emphasizes the notion of something that 
is being transmitted or ‘carried down’ from the past2. This is probably the most 
common and general understanding of the term to theorists of tradition, such as 
Edward Shils (1981) and Gadamer (1989). However, there are others, for 
example, Pieper (2008), who offer a narrower definition of tradition framing it 
within the context of religion so that the focus of tradition is the transmission of 
‘sacred tradition’ (Pieper 2008, p. 31-51) and explicitly opposing it to ‘secular’ 
traditions.  
What is clear is that common to the various definitions of tradition is the idea that 
something from the past is retained in the present such that it continues to be 
remembered and relived. In this paper, I am utilising the broader account of 
tradition but reconfiguring it so as to account for both the continuity and change 
that occurs within a society. In effect, the dynamics of a tradition(s) functions as 
the condition for the possibility of the reproduction of society. I am using the term 
reproduction here to indicate both the stability and transformation of a society. 
A preliminary question that needs to be addressed concerns why – given the 
scathing critique of tradition  conducted during the Enlightenment – we should 
re-consider the role of tradition as a necessary condition for the reproduction of 
society. Such a re-consideration has already been enacted by H. G. Gadamer, 
who, in Truth and Method (1989, p. 277-285) rehabilitates the concept of tradition 
from its Enlightenment critics. He argues that the Enlightenment critique of the 
authority legitimized by tradition is derived from the value that Enlightenment 
theorists placed upon reason. They argued that since the knowledge and truths 
derived from a tradition could not be rationally justified then they could not be 
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considered as reliable. The inherited wisdom transmitted by the tradition(s) had 
no place within Enlightenment thinking.   
Gadamer’s defence of tradition is twofold: (a) the value of a tradition(s) is that it 
has survived the test of time. This shows that a tradition(s) preserves what is best 
and it explains why Gadamer thinks that the past still has something to teach us. 
However, this does not mean that what is of value in a tradition(s) will remain so 
forever, since it is always possible that the truths embodied in a tradition change. 
But these changes will in turn further the growth of the tradition rather than 
constitute an end of the tradition(s); (b) the Enlightenment mistrust of the 
authority of tradition configured this authority as irrational (since it had no 
rational justification) and by implication oppressive (since it had to be accepted). 
Gadamer responds by claiming that this is mistaken, for to accept something as 
an authority is not to accept something that is irrational, but rather to recognise a 
person’s capabilities. When, for example, we are unwell we go to the authority in 
medicine – the doctor – to ask for help. In this situation we recognise the doctor 
as the person who is superior to us in knowledge and his judgement therefore 
overrides our own. There is, therefore, no contrast between reason and authority 
because seeking the authority is, in fact, the rational thing to do. 
One possible objection to centralising tradition in the understanding of society is 
this: if a tradition is concerned with the transmission of the past to the present, 
other than historical interest, why should it carry any weight? Doesn’t a society 
continue to function with or without tradition(s)? 
In answer to these questions Shils (1987) argues that tradition(s) function as a 
regulative ideal(s). It is because the past has been handed down over successive 
generations and accepted that one considers what has been transmitted by the past 
as entailing a normative element and therefore not something that one is 
indifferent to. The ‘transmitted’ comes across as the ‘natural’ way of doing things 
and acting: it offers a pattern or blueprint of the way social practices, customs and 
beliefs are conducted. Members of a society internalise these patterns of acting 
and communicating that in turn serve to re-confirm what has been handed down, 
even if this re-confirmation goes unnoticed: ‘past practices persist while 
appearing as if their connection with the past, if noticed at all, is entirely 
secondary to their ‘naturalness’ and their ‘rightness’’ (Shils 1981, p. 201). The 
traditions of a society function as normative ideals of patterns of action, rules of 
behaviour or systems of belief that members of accept as a form of guidance.  
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1.2. Tradition and social change 
However, while the tradition posits these regulative ideals, the interaction 
between the person and his/her social context might generate disagreement and 
the desire to change the tradition. This is the crucial point: what is the relationship 
between tradition and change or conflict? It is therefore necessary to examine the 
relationship between tradition(s) and changes in society so as to understand how 
a society’s way of life is reproduced despite the changes that come about over 
time. The interesting question is: to what extent does a society change but still 
consider itself to be the same society. 
There is a certain resistance to changing traditions that are the background of a 
society: to replace a tradition with another requires a certain amount of material, 
moral and intellectual effort. These elements are not conducive to change which 
explains why traditions appear durable and lasting. And yet, societies change: the 
‘world’ of our great grandparents is not the same as ours despite considering 
ourselves to be members of the same society – the same, in fact, though not 
identical. What contributes to this feeling of sameness is not the fact of living on 
the same spatial location or of having the same nationality as our predecessors, 
but a feeling of continuity with them.  
The changes that take place in a society are changes that retain something from 
the past and introduce something different into it. These changes take place in a 
piecemeal fashion: if the changes occur at an institutional level, it is one 
institution or part of an institution that changes while the rest continues to 
function; if it concerns values, the change involves a set of values but not all the 
values within that society. And because these changes are replaced by something 
else there is always some sense of continuity with the past.  
The consistent identities, those identities in the various spheres of social life some longer than 
others and interconnected with each other, preserve the society by keeping some of its past in 
the present and by sustaining the sense of identity through time. (Shils 1981, p. 168) 
Changes occur because although it is much easier to accept the society one is born 
into, over time, it is quite possible that certain traditions are perceived as an 
obstacle to someone or to some group’s fulfilment. Two preliminary points 
concerning the nature of the relationship between a tradition(s) and change should 
be made: (a) a tradition has within itself the ‘potentiality of being changed’ but 
these changes are enacted by those who have inherited the tradition (Shils 1981, 
p. 213); (b) the fact that a tradition is inherited and accepted does not mean that 
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its recipients do not reflect upon it. As it is received, a tradition(s) is subjected to 
critical rational analysis and certain features might prove to be unsatisfactory, as 
a result, triggering the desire for change (Shils 1981, p. 215). 
The latter point requires further elaboration. The desire for change arises because 
(a) the tradition is no longer considered relevant to the present situation since the 
current situations could not have been anticipated in advance, and cannot be 
resolved by an appeal to the traditions of society3; and (b) the tradition is 
inapplicable to the future for humans accept not only what they have inherited, 
but they also posit ‘new’ and ‘different’ ends that they consider conducive to their 
life. As a result, the tradition is changed or rather, modified, to incorporate what 
is perceived as the future situation.  
What this account of tradition shows is that the concept of tradition is not a ‘static’ 
one whereby a tradition is received and passively accepted. On the contrary, I am 
arguing that traditions are dynamic in that they constitute the conditions that make 
possible the ongoing existence of a society, i.e., its reproduction. This is why I 
find Pieper’s account of tradition as ‘sacred’ in that it transmits (a) what is 
identical at the origins (Pieper 2008, p. 47) and (b) that the dynamism of a 
tradition is merely a reconfiguration of this original religious message into 
contemporary idiom (Pieper 2008, p. 15) to be too narrow to explain both stability 
and change within a society.  
A tradition presents the opportunity for communicative interaction within society 
and through the challenges, discussions and debates both the tradition and the 
society that is embedded within it are modified and revitalised. This can be seen, 
for example, in the reception of traditional moral codes and the reaction to them 
by members of a society. Despite being inherited, these moral codes are reflected 
upon (they might be perceived as oppressive, or irrelevant to contemporary life) 
and this reflection might lead to a desire – not so much for its rejection – for 
changes to them.  
2.0. Communication and Society 
2.1. Communication and social maintenance 
It is evident that the concept of tradition cannot be easily dismissed from an 
attempt to understand the processes of social reproduction. The tradition, as the 
past communicating in the present, continues to exert its influence on the 
dynamics of a society. Traditionalists are keen to point out that while modernists 
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tend to eschew anything related to the past in favour of the present and the future, 
the past continues to operate as a taken-for-granted, background condition in the 
processes of social reproduction. In this respect, Gadamer has highlighted this 
issue in his discussion on ‘Prejudices as conditions for understanding’ in Truth 
and Method (Gadamer 1989, p. 277-307). 
Clearly what is needed is not just an acknowledgement of tradition(s) as a 
continuing presence, but rather the need to regain confidence in it. One obstacle 
to regaining confidence in the past is, for example, the contemporary glorification 
of technological inventions that create the impression that we are living in a 
perpetual present. Each new invention inaugurates another beginning which has 
little to do with what came before it. Within this frame of mind, time has been 
compressed into the present such that the past becomes distant as soon as 
something new is constructed. While modernists embrace technology as the key 
to building a progressive society that has no ties with the past these  attempts have 
repeatedly failed because idea that a society can break from its past and start over, 
at a zero point, has proved to be an illusion.  
However, the concept of tradition outlined so far can be criticised as a modified 
version of the transmission model of communication. Given that the transmission 
model operates within the framework of ‘A sending a message to B’, this model 
can easily be re-configured as ‘the past sending a message to the present’. This 
model shows its limitations in Pieper’s account of tradition as ‘sacred tradition’ 
which he describes as a process or ‘activity’ between two ‘partners’ where one 
transmits and the other receives a certain content such as ‘a statement about 
reality, an interpretation of reality, a proverb’. He calls this content the ‘tradition 
of truth’ (Pieper 2008, p. 9-10). Since, on this account, there is a temporal 
positioning of the sender as prior to the receiver, he goes on to claim that if we 
go back in time, we arrive at the worldly origins of the tradition and these in turn 
are ‘the first recipients of a proclamation which flows from a divine source’ 
(Pieper 2008, p. 28-29). It might be his Christian background, but the structure of 
his argument is similar to the arguments for the existence of God that proceed 
from effects to causes until one arrives at a first cause that is outsides the series 
of causal relations. While for Pieper it is only ‘sacred traditions’ that count as 
‘true’ traditions because (a) only they go back to an origin that is transcendent 
and (b) only they carry the weight of authority and the power to create an 
obligation’ (Pieper 2008, p. 37-47) and while, admittedly, he does not deny the 
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importance of secular traditions both traditions have a common denominator in 
that they transmit the past to the present. 
The implication of accepting a transmission model of communication in trying to 
account for social reproduction is that it neglects the sense of belonging that is an 
essential part of adhering to a tradition. To explain the way a tradition generates 
a sense of belonging, I would like to introduce the distinction introduced by James 
Carey in Communication as Culture (2009) between the ritual and transmission 
models of communication. This distinction parallels the different ways in which 
Wittgenstein understood the nature and role of language. In the Wittgenstein of 
the Tractatus (1922) the function of language was that of transmitting information 
that can be true or false of the world. This account reduces the diversity of 
language to its descriptive element, a diversity that in the Wittgenstein of the 
Philosophical Investigations (2001) celebrates as a virtue.  In this text there is a 
shift towards the understanding of language in terms of its use within a culture. 
As a result, Wittgenstein claims that one does more with language than ‘merely’ 
describe reality but rather enables persons to interact and do things within a ‘form 
of life’.  
These models of communication parallel the opposing representational and 
constructivist views of language, 
We must first discard the view of language as reference, correspondence and representation 
and the parallel view that the function of language is primarily to express assertions about the 
world. Then we must substitute the view that language – communication – is a form of action 
– or better, interaction – that not merely represents or describes but actually moulds or 
constitutes the world.(Carey 2009, p. 64)   
The transmission model of communication is defined by Carey as ‘a process 
whereby messages are transmitted and distributed in space for the control of 
distance and people’ (Carey 2009, p. 13). The origin of this usage in the 19th 
century included both the transportation of people or goods and the imparting of 
information. Carey argues that the transmission model – manifested in the 
developing railway network – constituted communication as a tool that enabled 
power and control to be exerted at a distance. For power and control to be 
achieved it was essential that people, goods or information arrived at their 
destination quickly so that their effect can be maximized. With the invention of 
the telegraph the concept of communication as transmission was narrowed down 
to the transmission of messages since messages could reach their destination 
much quicker than the transportation of goods or people4. 
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The key to understanding the transmission model of communication is the 
association of space with the projection of power. Carey’s analysis of the 
newspaper from the perspective of the transmission model reveals that the 
newspaper functions as a tool that transmits information or entertainment (or 
both) across large distances. From this perspective the questions that arise in 
newspaper studies concern their ‘effects’ upon audiences: does the news 
enlighten or obscure reality, does it change or strengthen attitudes, does it 
generate credibility or doubt? Other questions might be functional: do they help 
integrate or not a society, do they promote or not personalities? (Carey 2009, p. 
16). The problem with such an approach to newspaper studies is that it is overly 
mechanistic assuming that the relation between question and answer is causal. 
Rothenbuhler (1998, p. 123-128) draws inspiration from Carey in furthering this 
line of argument: by focussing on communication in terms of its effects or results 
(a) other qualities (‘aesthetic richness’, ‘hermeneutic possibilities’ or ‘historical 
importance’) are neglected and (b) communication is broken down into 
‘isolatable units’ that focus on ‘an act [rather than] interaction’. 
The alternative ritual model of communication is defined as ‘a process through 
which a shared culture is created, modified and transformed’5 (Carey 2009, p. 33). 
Carey’s use of the concept of ritual should be specified insofar as he is 
emphasising the act of communication as a ritual rather than the performance of 
rituals as a form of communication; while the analysis of rituals as a form of 
communication has a long history (Rothenbuhler 1998; Sorensen 2005; etc), the 
notion of communication as a ritual is relatively recent and Carey is usually 
credited with its origins in the literature.  
According to Carey’s account, the ritual model of communication enables 
members of a community to belong, participate and create the way of life or a 
culture within which they live. This model of communication consolidates the 
identity of a community over time by reiterating its beliefs, practices and customs. 
It is concerned with the ‘maintenance of society in time’, the ‘creation, 
representation, and celebration of shared even if illusory beliefs’ and ultimately 
it brings ‘persons together in fellowship and commonality’ (Carey 2009, p. 33). 
The crucial underlying feature of the ritual model is its temporal dimension: by 
re-living the past as the present, it is possible for a society to reproduce itself on 
the basis of what it shares, of what belongs to it.  
In his analysis of the origins of the ritual model, Carey highlights its religious 
foundation, and in particular that aspect of religion that emphasized praying, 
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chanting and ceremony (as opposed to sermon, instruction and admonition). The 
emphasis of the ritualistic model is that of bonding the community together, as 
opposed to the transmission of messages to members of the community each of 
whom is perceived as a solitary individual. However, even without the religious 
background, the purpose of ritual remains that of providing a meaningful context 
within which human actions acquire significance. In effect, rituals – linguistic 
and non-linguistic – constitute a way of life by taking up a variety of ‘symbolic 
forms’. These symbolic forms function ‘internally’ in the sense that they 
consolidate the way of life of a society, as opposed to their having an external 
purpose by functioning beyond themselves. The purpose of these symbolic forms 
is not to provide ‘information, but confirmation, not to alter attitudes or change 
minds but to represent an underlying order of things, not to perform functions but 
to manifest an ongoing and fragile social process’ (Carey 2009, p. 15).  
Adopting the ritual model of communication in the analysis of newspapers shifts 
the analysis towards the world-view or vision that is being communicated through 
the newspaper. One might say that, on Carey’s view, reading the newspaper is an 
invitation towards a metaphysic with different forces engaged in conflict on the 
world-stage. While the newspaper organises these forces as a presentation of 
reality, what it communicates ‘is not information but drama. It does not describe 
the world but portrays an arena of dramatic forces and action; it exists solely in 
historical time; and it invites our participation on the basis of our assuming, often 
vicariously, social roles within it’ (Carey 2009, p. 17).  
Although Carey’s examples of communication as ritual seem to focus on the 
media, Rothenbuhler (1998, p. 123-129) demonstrates the appropriateness of 
Carey’s ideas in the analysis of everyday communication as ritual: (1) while the 
transmission model treats humans as isolated and causally effecting each other 
with communication as a ‘tool’ one uses, the ritual model conceptualises humans 
as embedded within a world of communication, with human life unfolding within 
a world of significance; (2) communication as ritual emphasizes the stability and 
order that is essential for social reproduction; the sameness of everyday 
communication allows social life to perpetuate itself and even change presumes 
such stability to be effective; (3) communication as ritual in everyday life 
constitutes reality in the same way as rituals do. This claim is underpinned by the 
argument that communicative processes promote a dramatic vision of reality as 
well as a way of living in that reality.  
10 
 
It should be pointed out that while the problem with the transmission model is 
that it ignores the larger context within which communication takes place Carey 
does not dismiss the transmission model outright, but rather re-positions it within 
the social context subsuming it under the broader account of communication as 
ritual.  
Neither of these counterposed views of communication necessarily denies what the other 
affirms. A ritual view does not exclude the processes of information transmission or attitude 
change. It merely contends that one cannot understand these processes aright except insofar as 
they are cased within an essentially ritualistic view of communication and social order. (Carey 
2009, p. 17) 
The upshot of Carey’s theorisation of communication as ritual and of its 
grounding within a tradition(s) is that together these provide the basis that can 
generate a sense of belonging to a society. In other words, the reproduction of a 
society takes as its point of departure the fact that we are born into a society that 
already has a way of life constituted by its traditions and maintained by ritualised 
forms of communication. However, while Carey acknowledges that the 
reproduction of society can entail the generation of conflicts (Carey 2009, p. 24) 
his interest is directed towards the stability and maintenance of a society. In order 
to explain the way conflicts are resolved within a society, it is necessary to 
supplement his account with that of other theorists of communication. 
2.2. Communication and conflict resolution 
In this section, I am arguing that the necessary condition for a society to reproduce 
itself is that of communicative action. As there is a broad spectrum of what 
constitutes communicative action, (ranging from the trivial to the serious), I am 
narrowing my discussion to those issues that can be considered central to the way 
of life of a society, i.e., the serious. I am therefore excluding other forms of 
communication – poetry, humour – on the grounds that it is the ‘serious’ 
communicative exchanges that generate a degree of involvement by those 
members of a society who might condemn or condone the proposed changes5. 
In my analysis of communicative interaction I utilize the writings of Jurgen 
Habermas on the grounds that central to his concerns is the question of the relation 
between social reproduction and language. In A Theory of Communicative Action 
(1987), he provides a theoretical account that explains the way conflicts can be 
resolved without society disintegrating into chaos6. For Habermas, since 
rationality is embedded within language, then rationally argued solutions 
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demonstrate how social conflicts can be overcome. Communicative action is 
therefore grounded in reason with its purpose defined as the achieving of mutual 
understanding (Habermas 2002, p. 294). This is opposed to strategic action which 
is geared towards a different purpose, i.e., success, manipulation. Clearly, the 
latter is parasitic upon in the former since the possibility of success or 
manipulation entails understanding the other. While this opposition is useful in 
conceptualising the different purposes of communication, the sharpness of the 
distinction has been criticised as untenable (Johnson 1991,Thomassen 2010). 
Speech act theory is the starting point for Habermas’ analysis of society because 
it clearly demonstrates the intimacy between language and a way of life. A society 
is defined as a ‘[s]ymbolically prestructured segment of reality that the adult 
subject can understand in a nonobjectivating attitude, that is, as one acting 
communicatively (as a participant in a system of communication)’ (Habermas 
2002, p. 89-90), The writings of J.L. Austin provide Habermas with both the 
concept of the utterance (as opposed to the sentence) and the notion of the 
illocutionary force of the utterance, where by uttering something a speaker is 
doing something, where by saying ‘I do’ one is getting married7. An utterance has 
therefore a ‘dual structure’ (Habermas 2002, p. 60) that consists of: (a) a 
performative aspect (or illocutionary aspect) and (b) a propositional content. The 
propositional content of an utterance is what the sentence is about, or what it 
refers to, while the performative aspect concerns its use, or what can be done with 
the propositional content. It is this pragmatic use of utterances that interests 
Habermas because it highlights the importance of the context as the 
intersubjective dimension of meaning.   
One simply would not know what it is to understand the meaning of a linguistic expression if 
one did not know how one could make use of it in order to reach understanding with someone 
about something. (Habermas 2002, p. 228) 
The communicative act takes place when the intention of the speaker is 
understood in the process of communicating some content. The content can be 
cognitive or non-cognitive so that with cognitive utterances the emphasis is upon 
the world and any disagreement will concern the truth or falsity of the content, 
with the social dimension taking secondary place. With non-cognitive utterances, 
the emphasis is on the social aspect while the cognitive side is secondary. But, 
the important point is that there is always a social dimension to language use 
because communication entails understanding both the content and the intention 
of the speaker, since the content must be understood as something specific, that 
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is, as a fact or an invitation or a promise, or a command, etc. Every type of 
utterance entails a social relation.  
Habermas’ ‘universal pragmatics’ describes the conditions that are fulfilled in 
everyday communicative exchanges. The continuation of this interaction assumes 
a number of things: (1) an utterance is meaningful (it follows the syntax of the 
language); (2) an utterance is true (it says something about the world); (3) an 
utterance is truthful (the speaker is consistent in what he/she says and does) and 
(4) an utterance is appropriate (the speaker has the right to say what he/she is 
doing). 
The four dimensions of communication are taken for granted in the flow of 
everyday interaction. But should they be questioned or challenged then it must be 
possible to offer reasons or justifications for one’s utterances; a speaker should 
be able to defend himself/herself against any disagreement with his/her views. It 
belongs to the very nature of communication that participants can offer reasons 
for what Habermas calls their ‘validity claims’ clearly demonstrating the close 
and necessary link between communication and reason, i.e., ‘communicative 
rationality’. Discourse is that process that occurs when communication is 
suspended and utterances are challenged; it is a meta-communicative process that 
asks for the reasons that justify the utterance. Discourse occurs 
when the meaning of the problematic validity claim conceptually forces participants to suppose 
that a rationally motivated agreement could in principle be achieved... (Habermas 1987a, p. 42)  
 
Of the four validity claims informing a communicative act, each has a different 
mode of what Habermas calls ‘redemption’. The validity claims can be grouped 
into two different ‘sets’ as there is a fundamental difference between them: one 
‘set’ includes the validity claims of comprehension and sincerity, while the other 
‘set’ the validity claims of truth and correctness. The difference between the two 
‘sets’ is that it is only the second ‘set’ that can be redeemed in discourse. In the 
case of comprehension, when an utterance is challenged with regard to its 
meaning the speaker can always use other words to convey the meaning. In the 
case of sincerity, the validity claim is redeemed if the actions of the speaker 
conform to his/her intention (such as keeping a promise). On the other hand, the 
validity claims of truth and appropriateness involve discursive argumentation: 
whether it is a question of establishing the truth of a statement or the 
appropriateness of a norm, the speaker must defend his/her claims by offering 
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reasons or justifications. Discourse is a meta-communicative process since it 
involves the suspension of everyday communication and yet, paradoxically it is 
only through further communication – argumentation – that communication 
breakdowns can only be resolved.  
It might be claimed that Habermas is optimistic about the power of argumentation 
for resolving conflict (Schrag in Ramsey and Miller 2003, p. 15-16). He is also 
dismissive of ritualistic discourse as a platform for social integration on the 
grounds that ritual is equated with magic and therefore inferior to rational 
discourse. This is an issue that Cheal (1992, pp. 363-374) takes up arguing for the 
ongoing value of rituals as offering (a) alternative visions of reality; (b) the 
possibility of social integration independently of argumentation; and (c) a 
response to changing social situations. For Cheal, Habermas’ concept of 
communicative action insofar as argumentation can lead to increasing conflict 
rather than its resolution; if this happens, then ritual discourse can prevent the 
social descent into chaos by tapping into shared ‘feelings of identification’ (Cheal 
1992, p. 371). 
The difficulty with Cheal’s argument that ritual can function as a form of social 
integration is that the problems that led to the conflict in the first place would 
remain unresolved; and while the force of the rituals might overcome the 
differences between participants temporarily, at some point the conflicts would 
still need to be resolved. This is the point highlighted by Sorensen who argues 
that ritual actions engage in a lower degree of ‘emotional intensity’ when 
contrasted to ‘real actions’. In effect, rituals do not necessary provide a platform 
for social integration over and above conflicting points of view, but can in turn 
perpetual conflict albeit with a lesser degree of intensity. Ritual communication 
masks conflict but makes no attempt to resolve it. In other words, Habermas’ 
theory of communicative action is still viable in that it provides a mechanism for 
the resolution of conflicts. 
 In ‘Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions and Lifeworld’ 
(Habermas 2002, p. 215-255), Habermas specifies the importance of the relation 
between communicative action and a way of life, i.e., the lifeworld within which 
communication takes place.  
The concept of communicative action must prove its worth within sociological theory of action. 
The latter is supposed to explain how social order is possible. In this respect, the analysis of 
the presuppositions of communicative action may be helpful. It opens us the dimension of the 
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background of the lifeworld, which enmeshes and stabilizes interaction to form higher-level 
aggregates. (Habermas 2002, p. 277) 
The question of social order and social transformation is central to social theory 
in that it seeks to explain how it is possible that a society composed of distinct 
persons – each pursuing their own interests – are able to live together and resolve 
the various conflicts that might arise between them. Habermas’ analysis of the 
possibility of social order introduces the concept of the lifeworld as the 
framework within which communicative action takes place.  
While most of the time communication unfolds without any feature of the 
lifeworld being questioned, at times disagreement and dissent occur and this 
continues until consensus is once again re-established through discourse. It is 
therefore, the lifeworld which provides the conditions for both social order and 
critical discussion. In A Theory of Communicative Action Vol II (1987b, p. 121-
124), Habermas illustrates this point with a story: at a construction site a new 
foreign worker is asked by one of the senior workers to fetch some beer for their 
morning break. This request can be challenged by the younger worker on a 
number of grounds: the validity claim to intelligibility (perhaps the young foreign 
worker does not understand German well); the validity claim to appropriateness 
(the young worker does not think it is part of his duties to fetch beer and not right 
of the senior worker to ask him); the validity claim to factual assumptions (there 
are no shops selling beer near the construction site) and the validity claim to 
sincerity (the young worker thinks that the senior worker is trying to humiliate 
him in front of the other workers). What Habermas wants to illustrate with this 
story is not only the possibility of challenging claims but the further point that 
with communicative action people bring their cultural competences and 
assumptions into the situation. In this story, the lifeworld of the foreign worker is 
different from that of the senior worker, and this explains why the young worker 
might think it odd to drink beer in the morning break. And he might not recognise 
that there is an informal hierarchy at the construction site that allows the senior 
worker to command the younger one. Following the breakdown in 
communication a new consensus is achieved, and this new consensus in turn feeds 
into the lifeworld.  
The relationship between the lifeworld and communicative action is circular in 
that both feed into each other: ‘the reproduction of the lifeworld is nourished 
through the contributions of communicative action, while the latter 
simultaneously is nourished through the resources of the lifeworld’ (Habermas 
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2002, p. 191). While Habermas’ account sees the lifeworld as the space where 
the processes of cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization take 
place, the value of communicative action8 is that it provides a mechanism for the 
resolution of conflict and therefore the means by which the continuity of a society 
is ensured. Through the medium of communication the way of life of a society is 
negotiated, revitalised and transmitted and by so doing, perpetuating the way of 
life that constitutes that society.  
The problem with Habermas’ account of communicative action is that it seems to 
be modelled upon a transmission or linear model of communication that reduces 
conflicts to the present moment. Despite the importance he attributes to the 
lifeworld, the theory of communicative action explains conflicts as ‘merely’ an 
issue that is happening now, and therefore ignoring the role the past might have 
had in generating conflicts. His account therefore sidesteps the inherited nature 
of such conflicts – their traditional underpinnings – and this reduces the 
possibility of understanding and resolving them.  
While Habermas does not seem to lament the loss of tradition(s) (1989) insofar 
as it will be replaced by a post-conventional society, by re-inscribing the 
formative influence of tradition upon the lifeworld, the possibility of conflict 
resolution is enhanced. It is against the background of a tradition(s) that feed(s) 
into the lifeworld that participation in a society makes sense, for on the one hand, 
traditions generate a sense of belonging and order but at the same time, they can 
also generate a sense of non-belonging and alienation. With the appearance of 
conflict it might becomes necessary to question whether both tradition(s) and 
society might be in need of refreshing. Although clearly it is a tradition(s) that 
transmits the content that can be the cause of conflict within the lifeworld, my 
concern in this paper is to recuperate the value of tradition in relation to a 
lifeworld as it is against the background of a tradition(s) that communicative 
interaction in the lifeworld can be understood. This is why the questions of 
whether a tradition(s) can be the vehicle that communicates ideological 
distortions and is therefore in need of a critical theory of society to uncover these 
distortions, or whether the resources of hermeneutics are sufficient to expose and 
revise prejudices, are not pertinent here insofar as I am concerned with 
demonstrating that a tradition(s) is the necessary condition for the existence of a 
lifeworld and the communicative interaction that sustains it8.  This is why 
Habermas’ account, whist clearly contributing to an understanding of 
communicative interactions that enable a society to reproduce itself, needs to be 
16 
 
supplemented with an account – such as Carey’s – that highlights the formative 
role that tradition(s) and ritual play in the constitution of a society as a temporal 
space in which stability is the norm and conflict a possibility.  
 
Conclusion 
The issue of social reproduction concerns the continued existence of a society’s 
way of life. It is a thorny issue in that it is closely tied to the value-system of a 
society and when established values are challenged this has the possibility of 
leading to violence. And assuming that violence is not a desirable means towards 
the resolution of conflicts, an approach to conflict resolution is needed that takes 
into consideration the different views of the members of a society until a solution 
can be found. This paper has argued for a close conceptual link between tradition, 
society and communication. In a sense this paper rephrases Gadamer’s assertion 
in The Hermeneutical Experience (1989), ‘To be situated within a tradition does 
not limit the freedom of knowledge but makes it possible (p. 241) with ‘to be 
situated within a tradition does not limit the freedom of communication but makes 
it possible’.   
In short, I have argued that (a) if tradition constitutes the background for social 
maintenance and transformation (i.e. social reproduction) and (b) if social 
maintenance and transformation require communicative interaction, then (c) 
tradition is the necessary condition that enables communication. 
1 I am using the term tradition in both singular and plural forms to indicate that a society might consist of a 
dominating tradition, but also other less-dominating traditions, some of which might also be in conflict with the 
dominant tradition. 
2 The emphasis on the past shows the difference between a tradition and a custom: in the case of the latter, a 
custom describes the way something is done, while in the case of the former it describes how something has 
always been done. 
3 While the proliferation of technologies in the contemporary world are a case in point, this pattern of change can 
be also found in traditional societies where the acceptance of the past as a guide was not applicable to every 
concrete situation. Situations arose for which there was ‘no wholly satisfactory explanation or guides to action’ 
(pp. 29-30) and this necessitated considering modifying patterns of action or beliefs in relation to these 
circumstances.   
4 Carey lists the characteristics of the transmission model as ‘persuasion; attitude change; behaviour modification; 
socialization through the transmission of information, influence, or conditioning or, alternatively, as a case of 
individual choice over what to read or view’ (p. 33). 
5 I am leaving aside the issue of the whether communicative interaction should be assumed as rational – as 
Habermas contends, or whether it should also include rhetorical dimensions as Gadamer and Schrag think. 
6 Habermas’ philosophical method is that of immanent critique whereby he retains the ideas of other writers that 
he finds still tenable for an understanding of contemporary society and organising hem into a systematic account; 
he also utilises empirical theories of society to produce ‘rational reconstructions’ that are both conceptual and 
empirical.  
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7 The difference between Habermas and others (for example Searle) is that while Austin focuses on those 
utterances that acquire their illocutionary force through convention, his interest lies in the illocutionary force of 
everyday utterances.  
8 Within the lifeworld communicative action enables the three structurally different processes of cultural 
reproduction, social integration and socialization to take place; these processes constitute the structural features 
of a society, namely culture, society and personality (1987a p. 137). 
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